This is part two of a three part series on the Iranian Revolution and its impact on the Middle East.
Part One – Part Two – Part Three
IN THE 20th CENTURY and finally with the Iranian Revolution, Islam, as a tool for political advancement, witnessed rising attention and relevance in political discourse and strategy. In the case of the United States political Islam was an opposition, especially in the Shiite dominated regions, yet despite the existence of Anti-American narratives, islamist movements received support and endorsement through various direct and indirect channels from Washington to counter its enemies.
Apart from the ongoing support of Saudi Arabia, arguably the most prevalent and clear demonstration of aid to political Islamist movements was seen in Afghanistan shortly after Khomeini’s return. While the United States just had lost a major ally in the region to an Islamist movement in Iran, through Operation Cyclone, President Reagan decided to support a (Sunni and more radical) Islamist movement to ensure the defeat of the communist enemy.
From this, one can conclude that Washington had acknowledged, surely witnessed and now even utilised the people-strength and influence of Islamism. However, it can be asserted that Capitol Hill underestimated that movements potential in its initial stages, as we saw the Revolution in Iran to be maintained (due to factors such as the Iran-Iraq War) and the Mujahedeen’s base later to be morphed into Washington’s enemies: Al Qaeda, Bin Laden and an increasingly radicalising form of militant Islam spreading across the Middle East.
Witnessing this phenomenon of anti-Americanism and political Islam in the subsequent years of the Iranian Revolution, the United States’ approach and policy for the Middle East is observed to be changing and adapting in accord to the altered dynamic of the Middle East.
Having lost its key ally to the region and at the strategically significant Persian Gulf, Washington required a new approach involving a stronger alliance with Israel and the Gulf States. This was particularly the case after the 444 days of the Hostage Crisis and the 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombings that saw roughly 240 U.S. servicemen killed during the Lebanese Civil War.
Triggered with Reagan’s description of Iran as “a state sponsor of terrorism”, and confirmed with the “diplomatic efforts to block arms sales to Iran” during the Iran-Iraq War; the region not only witnessed the severe break in US-Iran diplomatic relations, but also saw major political, social and military hostilities, as seen with naval “Operation Praying Mantis” and the shooting down of Iran Air flight 655 (Katzman, 2015). These hostilities were ultimately a result of the challenge to the Middle East’s balance of power which was dependent, established and maintained from the 1960’s through the Nixon Doctrine.
The Nixon Doctrine promoted and utilised the major monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Iran as “twin pillars”, the fundamental tools for the stability of the Middle East. However, subsequent to gaining $550 million worth in military arms and weaponry in 1972 alone, one of the now highly armed “pillars”, witnessed and consolidated a major regime change with a confirmed cynicism towards the United States. After arming and supporting states of the Middle East, the pre-1979 approach of reliance and trust that was essential to this strategy had clearly perished and become outdated as a consequence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Now that the United States had tilted away from that approach, it was time to replace that model with a more practical and intrusive tactic, especially after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.
One of the examples demonstrating the perished reliance-based approach by the US and a shift towards an even more intrusive foreign policy, is the significant increase in US military presence on bases across the Gulf. This military and intelligence presence is in contrast to pre-1986, where practically no significant nor direct (as opposed to in-direct and reliance-based) military power was deployed in the region. Although these increases were considerably uplifted in the presidency of his successor Ronald Reagan, its initiator was in fact President Carter.
As part of the “Carter Doctrine”, the president emphasised and expressed his concern about the “loss of a region ‘containing more than two thirds of the world’s exportable oil”, in which “the free movement of Middle East oil” could easily be disrupted. Additionally, Capitol Hill was concerned regarding the influence that their adversary – the USSR – could have in revolutionary Iran. Carter in his State of the Union address noted that “such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force” – a precedent for Reagan’s policy in the Middle East as seen with “Operation Cyclone” in Afghanistan.
Combining regional factors, such as the ‘menace’ of the Soviet Union for Iran and the loss of one of the “twin pillars” to Khomeini’s leadership, resulted in the initial funding of $500 million for the installation of “Rapid Deployment Forces” (RDF) across bases of the Middle East, as seen in Egypt, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
As the funding of this program grew into the billions of dollars, it demonstrates the shift in international relations of the Middle East through a further intrusive and less reliance-based US foreign policy. Moreover, it set a precedent for the RDF successor: The United States Central Command, involved in the “wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the accidental downing” of the Iran Air flight 655.
The threat that Iran epitomised and the impact that the Islamic Revolution had on the now fearful superpower forced it to implement rapid and radical changes to its policy which not only affected the way in which the United States interacted with the Middle East, but also the domestic dynamic, dominated by the remaining ally Saudi Arabia and the new rival: The Islamic Republic of Iran.
This is part two of a three part series on the Iranian Revolution and its impact on the Middle East.
